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INTRODUCTION

Those who follow Supreme Court litigation know that the Court is
prone to let issues percolate in state and lower federal courts before granting
certiorari. Environmental litigation is no exception. Knowing this, it seems
only a matter of time before the Court revisits an intensely-litigated issue it
1

* Professor, Regent University School of Law. B.A., 1971, University of Kansas; Masters of
Public Administration, 1981, University of Southern California; J.D., 1989, Regent
University School of Law. Special thanks to Mr. Neil Cohen for his helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
1
See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We have
in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of
‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a
better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”); see also Tom S.
Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower Courts:
An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 J. POL. 150 (2013).
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last addressed twelve years ago —the remedies available to private parties
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”), and the relationship between those remedies.
This matter is critical for those caught in the web of environmental cleanup
because the two remedies available to them under CERCLA—cost recovery
under § 107 and contribution under § 113—are entirely distinct. Whichever
remedy a court affords plaintiffs will affect the litigants’ burden of proof, the
standard of liability, the available defenses, the allocation of costs, and the
applicable statutes of limitations—indeed, the entire proceeding.
Furthermore, given the cost of environmental response actions, the effect
on a party’s financial liability pursuant to a court’s decision on this issue can
be staggering.
This article suggests this issue is not only worthy of the Court’s
attention but may now be ripe for consideration. First, there is a clear split
of authority among the federal courts with respect to several questions left
unresolved when the Court last addressed this issue in Atlantic Research.
Second, the lower courts’ positions on these questions are becoming
increasingly well-defined and articulated. Third, without further
clarification, those exposed to liability under CERCLA face uncertainty and
extremely high financial risks. Finally, if not addressed, some positions
taken by lower courts have the capacity to be both unfair to the parties
involved and counterproductive to CERCLA’s goals.
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2

See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007) (discussed at greater length
in Part II of this article).
3
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1994 & Supp. III 2016) (commonly known as “Superfund”).
4

Id.
See Steven Ferrey, Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When the Lower Federal
Courts Don’t Follow the Supreme Court, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 151, 153–54
(2016). See also infra notes 28–36 and accompanying text.
6
See Ferrey, supra note 5, at 154 (suggesting that the cost of cleaning up the nation’s
5

hazardous waste sites over the next 40 years could exceed $250 billion, much of which would
be borne by private parties). Ferrey cited U.S. EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION’S WASTE
SITES: MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS viii (2004), and noted that the cost estimate
included Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) corrective action initiatives
and the cleanup up of leaking underground storage tanks.
7
See infra Part III.
8
9
10

See id.
See infra Part IV.

As the courts have noted, CERCLA’s language may be “inartful,” but its goals are
“straightforward”—to “promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure
that the costs of such cleanup efforts [are] borne by those responsible for the contamination.”
Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 200 (7th Cir. 2012).
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It is not surprising that courts could disagree on the application of
CERCLA. The statute has never been considered a “model of legislative
clarity.” It was, after all, hastily enacted by Congress as a “last-minute
compromise” during the waning days of a lame-duck session without the
benefit of full technical revisions of the text. Although the House and
Senate had considered related legislation for years, the bill that finally
became law was hurriedly put together with little debate and finalized during
the interim between the 1980 national election and the assumption of office
by President Reagan. CERCLA’s provisions are complex, and its text has
been described as “puzzl[ing]” and “cryptic”—even “indecipherable.”
Given the haste with which the final bill was negotiated and drafted, its
legislative history is also largely unhelpful, having been characterized as
“vague,” “sparse,” and “self-contradictory.” The Supreme Court has
provided some clarity from time to time, but the Atlantic Research opinion
in 2007 was its last word on this issue, and, in that decision, the Court
knowingly left a number of critical questions unresolved.
Since the Court rendered the Atlantic Research decision, splits of
authority have developed among the lower courts on several of the case’s
unresolved questions, and the many disparities those courts have created
suggest the need for Supreme Court intervention. This article focuses on
just one of the issues on which the courts are divided: whether a party that
is eligible to seek contribution under § 113 may simultaneously pursue a
cost recovery claim under § 107 for unrelated expenses.
11

12

13

14

15

16

11

United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 723, 741 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989).
13
See FRANK P. GRAD, 3 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02[1][a] at 4A-23 (1998).
14
See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005); CP
Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg Zoino and Assocs., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.H. 1991);
United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 883 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev’d,
104 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1997).
15
See, e.g., United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Michigan, 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989); Dedham
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 229, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., No. 85-CV-73764 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 1989);
United States v. New Castle Cty., 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265 (D. Del. 1986). One author has
described CERCLA’s legislative process as “peculiar,” noting that “there were no mark-up
sessions, hearings, or other public processes.” See Alfred R. Light, CERCLA’s Cost
Recovery Statute of Limitations: Closing the Books or Waiting for Godot? 16 SE. ENVTL
L.J. 245, 251 (2008).
16
The Court noted, for example, that it was “not decid[ing] whether . . . compelled costs of
response [incurred directly by a PRP] are recoverable under § 113(f), § 107(a), or both”).
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 n.6 (2007).
12
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This article suggests that the answer to that question should be yes. A
majority of courts that have considered this issue have taken that position,
but some courts have diverged, creating both uncertainty and unfairness for
the parties involved. Courts that have taken the minority position appear to
have done so based upon a false dichotomy, i.e., a perceived choice that is
unnecessary under the terms of the statute and uncalled for under the
Atlantic Research decision. A minority of courts have suggested that: (1) a
private plaintiff may only assert one type of claim—either a cost recovery
claim or an action for contribution; (2) a determination as to which type of
claim the plaintiff may assert is inherently based upon either the nature of
the costs at issue or the procedural status of the party; and (3) of those two
factors, the party’s procedural status takes priority.
The better position—followed by the majority of courts—is that both the
nature of the costs and the procedural status of the party matter, and to
ignore the nature of the specific costs claimed is neither necessary nor
appropriate. Instead, the court should consider the procedural status of the
party with respect to each specific cost claimed. Under that approach, a
party might be limited to contribution as a remedy for some costs but, at the
same time, be permitted to seek full cost recovery for other expenses. This
approach would be consistent with the text and structure of CERCLA and
with the Court’s decision in Atlantic Research. It would, furthermore,
encourage private-party cooperation and reinforce CERCLA’s goal of
promoting voluntary and timely cleanups. In support of this thesis, Part II
of this article will discuss the Atlantic Research decision. For context, that
part will briefly explain the alternatives for private cost allocation under
CERCLA, discuss the historical interplay of §§ 107 and 113, and then
summarize the decision itself. Part III will discuss the aftermath of Atlantic
Research in terms of: (1) the substantial number and nature of issues still
unresolved; (2) the current split among the courts on the question of
simultaneous contribution and cost recovery claims; and (3) the ongoing
South Dayton Landfill litigation, which provides a case in point. Finally,
Part IV will address the article’s suggested approach in permitting
simultaneous claims under §§ 107 and 113 and discuss how such an
approach would comport with the text and goals of CERCLA and with the
Court’s decision in Atlantic Research.
17

18

19

20

17

See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.
19
See infra Part III.
20
See infra Part IV.
18
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II. THE ATLANTIC RESEARCH DECISION

A. Private Party Cost Allocation Under CERCLA
From the beginning of the Superfund program in 1980, private party
remediation has been the “backbone” of the CERCLA process. The
government itself is authorized to clean up contaminated sites with funds
provided by Congress and then recover its costs from “potentially
responsible parties” (“PRPs”) under CERCLA § 104. Federal funds,
however, are inadequate to finance the vast majority of cleanups.
CERCLA’s success, therefore, depends upon the cooperation of private
parties to finance the remediation of most sites.
Whether a private party conducts a cleanup itself, reimburses the
government for its response costs, or engages in a combination of the two,
CERCLA provides private parties two alternative mechanisms for
recovering all or part of their costs: an action for contribution or a cost
recovery claim. CERCLA § 113(f)(1) authorizes a PRP that has been sued
by either the government or another private entity under § 106 or § 107,
21

22

23

24

21

Ferrey, supra note 5, at 200.
Liability under CERCLA falls upon four classes of potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”)
identified in § 107(a) of the Act: (1) the current owners and operators of a contaminated site;
(2) anyone who owned or operated the site at the time hazardous substances were disposed
of; (3) any party that arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at the site; and (4) any
transporter who was involved in selecting the site for disposal. The broad scope of liability
reflected in these four categories has been further expanded by the courts’ liberal
construction. Liability may further extend to corporate parents or subsidiaries of those
entities, corporate successors, corporate officers and shareholders, trustees, guardians and
receivers, and, in some cases, secured creditors. See, e.g., United States v. USX Corp., 68
F.3d 811, 814–15 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478,
489 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Amtreco, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 959, 966 (M.D. Ga. 1993);
Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360, 367 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In
re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., Nos. 1989-107, 89-220, 89-224 (consol.), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19167 (D. V. Sept. 2, 1993, as amended).
23
See, e.g., Katherine N. Probst, Superfund 2017: Cleanup Accomplishments and the
Challenges Ahead 1–29 (ACEC 2017) (noting the inadequacy of EPA’s funding to
accomplish the agency’s goals); see also Ferry, supra note 5, at 200–01 (asserting that “for
every site on which EPA traditionally leads the cleanup, private parties clean up one hundred
sites”).
24
See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND SITE CLEANUP WORK
THROUGH
ENFORCEMENT
AGREEMENTS
AND
ORDERS,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-site-cleanup-work-through-enforcementagreements-and-orders [perma.cc/R3DK-W3YN] (noting that roughly 69 percent of all
cleanup work underway at Superfund sites around the nation is being funded by private
parties through the enforcement process, and that for every dollar the Superfund
enforcement program spends, private parties invest eight dollars in cleanup work).
22
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and has paid an inequitable portion of the cleanup costs, to seek
contribution from other responsible parties. Section 113(f)(3)(B) also
provides a right of contribution to any party that has “resolved its liability to
the United States or a State” by “satisfy[ing] a settlement agreement or a
court judgment” and, in doing so, has paid more than its share of the costs.
Alternatively, a party may bring a direct cost recovery action under §
107(a)(4)(B) if: (1) it has not been sued; and (2) it has incurred costs of its
own in performing an environmental response.
Given a choice between the two alternatives, parties normally choose
cost recovery for several reasons. First, a § 107 cost recovery claim entitles
a plaintiff to full recovery of expenses with defendants held jointly and
severally liable, unless defendants can prove that the harm they caused is
“divisible.” In a contribution action under § 113, by contrast, defendants
are severally liable, and a plaintiff bears the burden of proving each
defendant’s proportional share of responsibility. Second, given the
25

26

27

28

29

30

25

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2019) provides: “Any person may seek contribution from any other
person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following
any civil action under section 9606 . . . or [ ] 9607(a) of this title.” (emphasis added). As
originally enacted in 1980, CERCLA did not include an express provision for contribution,
but a number of district courts held that such a right existed by implication under CERCLA’s
cost recovery provision in § 107 or as a matter of right under federal common law. See, e.g.,
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161 (2004).
26
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 140 (2007). Congress amended
CERCLA in 1980 through the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA,”
100 Stat. 1613) to provide an express right to contribution in § 113(f)(1) as well as this
previously unrecognized contribution right through § 113(f)(3)(B). The provision reads as
follows: “A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or
all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or
judicially approved settlement may seek contribution . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2019)
(emphasis added).
27
See HOBERT, KELSEY-HAYES & NCR, PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI, HOBART V.
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF OHIO at 16–17 (2015).
28
See, e.g., Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2014)
(suggesting that, “[g]iven the choice, a rational PRP would prefer to file an action under §
107(a)(4)(B) in every case” (emphasis added)).
29
United States v. Colorado & E. Ry. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (“It is . . .
well settled that [CERCLA] § 107 imposes joint and several liability . . . .”); accord Pinal
Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400, 1404 (D. Ariz. 1996); Laidlaw
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624, 629 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Dartron
Corp. v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., 917 F. Supp. 1173, 1181 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Steven
Ferrey, Toxic “Plain Meaning” and “Moonshadow”: Supreme Court Unanimity and
Unexpected Consequences, 24 VILL. ENTVL. L.J. 1, 8 (2013).
30
See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 920 F. Supp. 991, 994 (E.D.
Ark. 1996) (“CERCLA . . . imposes joint and several liability upon [responsible parties]
and/or [potentially responsible parties] in § 107(a) cost recovery actions, . . . and several
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differences between several and joint-and-several liability, defendants
generally bear the costs allocated to “orphan shares” in a cost recovery
claim, while a plaintiff absorbs those costs in a contribution action. Finally,
the statute of limitations for a cost recovery claim is six years for a remedial
action, while the statute of limitations for a contribution action under § 113
is only three years. Unfortunately, private plaintiffs do not get to choose
their remedy. The Court has made it clear “that §§ 107(a) and 113(f)
provide two ‘clearly distinct’ remedies” and that a “choice of remedies
simply does not exist” for private plaintiffs. The courts, however, have
consistently wrestled with determining the precise boundary between the
two.
31

32

33

34

35

36

B.

The Historical Interplay of §§ 107 and 113

A detailed discussion of CERCLA’s early history—and precisely how
the contribution/cost recovery line was drawn by the courts before SARA —
is beyond the scope of this article. However, the development of
contribution as a remedy for private plaintiffs has played a key role in
CERCLA’s statutory scheme. The 1986 SARA amendments made explicit
what many courts had previously inferred: that parties who were liable under
CERCLA could seek contribution from other PRPs. In fact, after SARA,
courts began funneling private parties increasingly toward § 113 and away
37

38

liability in § 113(f) contribution actions.”); accord Fresno v. NL Indus., No. CV-F93-5091,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15534 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 1995). As a reflection of how established
the presumption of joint and several liability is, the Atlantic Research Court noted, in passing,
that “[w]e assume without deciding that § 107(a) provides for joint and several liability.” Atl.
Research, 551 U.S. at 140 n.7.
31
See, e.g., DMJ Assocs., L.L.C. v. Capasso, No. 97-CV-7285 (DLI)(RML), 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 177460, at *72 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015) (explaining that “orphan shares” are “the
share[s] of cleanup costs at a contaminated site equitably attributable to a PRP that is unable
to pay” and that they “typically arise when a PRP cannot be located or is insolvent, deceased,
dissolved, or bankrupt”).
32
42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B). A remedial action is a response designed to provide a
permanent remedy at a site, and typically includes one or more specific actions that are listed
in the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
33
Id. at § 9613(g)(3).
34
Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 138 (quoting the Court’s previous decision in Cooper Industries
v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 163 n.3 (2004)).
35
Id. at 140.
36
See infra Section II.B.
37
Pub. L. 99-499, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.
38
See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 215 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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from § 107 as a means of recovering cleanup costs. By 2003, at least ten of
the federal circuits—every circuit court that had considered the issue—held
that contribution was the only form of recovery available to liable parties
under the statute. The practical effect of this position was to preclude
almost all private parties from asserting cost recovery claims or
counterclaims. Hence, it became generally accepted that government
entities had much freer access to cost recovery under § 107 than did private
parties.
39

40

41

42

39

David Fotouhi & Michael K. Murphy, Do CERCLA Cost Recovery and Contribution
Rights Overlap?, LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2015) at 1 (suggesting that “[t]raffic-directing [by the
courts] dramatically narrowed Section 107 by judicial fiat” after SARA as “courts gradually
steered liable parties away from Section 107 and required them to use Section 113”).
40
By 2003, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits had all held that liable parties other than government entities were
precluded from suing or countersuing for cost recovery under § 107. See, e.g., United
Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1998);
New Castle Cty. v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997); Axel
Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 191 F.3d 409, 420 (4th Cir. 1999); Centerior
Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998);
NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co., 227 F.3d 776, 791 (7th Cir. 2000); Dico, Inc. v.
Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525, 532 (8th Cir. 2003); Pinal Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998); Young v.
United States, 394 F.3d 858, 865 (10th Cir. 2005); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996). Although the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed the question in OHM Remediation Serv. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116
F.3d 1574 (5th Cir. 1997), the court was not faced with that issue and did not directly address
it. At least some district courts within the Fifth Circuit, however, followed the majority. See,
e.g., United States v. Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1249 (D. Colo. 2001) (holding that §
107 counterclaims could be asserted only by federal, state or tribal governments or by a nonliable parties).
41
The Atlantic Research Court correctly observed that, “if PRPs do not qualify as ‘any other
person’ for purposes of § 107(a)(4)(B), it is unclear what private party would.” Atl. Research,
551 U.S. at 136.
42
See, e.g., United States v. Chrysler Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 849, 860 (N.D. Ohio 2001)
(noting that a number of courts had “distinguished between federal and private PRPs as to
whether they may bring cost recovery actions under § 107”); Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances
Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a
government entity could bring a cost recovery claim under § 107(a) even if it was itself a liable
party); Alabama v. Ala. Wood Treating Corp., Inc., Civ. No. 85-0642-CG-C, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37372, at *13–*17 (S.D. Ala. June 6, 2006) (noting a split of authority among the
courts, but finding persuasive the “majority” of courts holding that private parties who are
PRPs may recover response costs only under CERCLA § 113, while government entities that
are PRPs may sue for cost recovery under § 107(a)); Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
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That thinking began to change in 2004 with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services. In Cooper Industries, the
Court suddenly and significantly narrowed access to § 113. The case
stemmed from the discovery of contamination at several industrial sites in
Texas. Aviall Services bought four aircraft engine maintenance facilities
from Cooper Industries in 1981. After operating the plants for some years,
Aviall discovered that both it and Cooper had contaminated the sites with
petroleum and other hazardous substances. When Aviall reported the
contamination to state authorities, the authorities threatened to take
enforcement action, but neither the state nor EPA actually took any
measures to compel cleanup. Instead, Aviall cleaned up the sites
“voluntarily” under state supervision and sued Cooper for contribution
under CERCLA § 113(f)(1).
Cooper moved for dismissal of the claim on the basis that Aviall itself
had not been sued under either §§ 106 or 107. Section 113(f)(1), under
which Aviall had brought its claim, provides that “[a]ny person may seek
contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under
[CERCLA] . . . during or following any civil action under [§§ 106 or 107].”
Cooper argued that Aviall could claim contribution under this section only
if enforcement action had first been brought against Aviall. The district
court agreed with Cooper’s argument and granted its motion to dismiss.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals initially affirmed that decision, but on
rehearing en banc, it reversed the lower court’s ruling, holding that “§
113(f)(1) allows a PRP to obtain contribution from other PRPs regardless of
whether the plaintiff has been sued under §§ 106 or 107.”
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling by essentially
reading the word “may” to mean “may only” and holding that § 113(f)(1)
authorizes an action for contribution only if the plaintiff itself has first been
subject to enforcement. The effect of this decision was to restrict the right
of contribution to parties that meet specific conditions. Today, as a result of
43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

43

543 U.S. 157 (2004).
Id. at 164.
45
Id. at 163.
44

46

Id.
Id. at 163–64.
48
Id. at 164.
49
Id.
47

50

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis added).
Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 164.
52
Id. at 165.
53
Id.
51

54

Id.

52
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Cooper Industries, to assert a claim for contribution under § 113(f)(1), a
party must first be sued under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107. Similarly, to bring
a claim for contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B), a plaintiff must first resolve
some or all of its liability with the United States or a state through an
administrative or judicially approved settlement.
The Cooper Industries court left unsettled the question of whether a
PRP that did not meet either of these requirements could seek cost recovery
under § 107 as an alternative. While the Court recognized that that question
“merit[ed] full consideration,” the parties had not briefed the issue, and the
Court declined to address it. However, with the right to contribution now
“drastically limited,” the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals,
along with a number of district courts, reversed their previous decisions and
decided that PRPs that did not qualify for contribution under the Court’s
more restrictive approach should be allowed to pursue cost recovery. That
thinking was finally affirmed by the Supreme Court three years later with its
ruling in United States v. Atlantic Research.
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C.

The Court’s Decision

The facts in Atlantic Research were unique in that the cleanup at issue
was not compelled either by an enforcement action or by a settlement
negotiated outside of the enforcement process. The Atlantic Research
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Corporation had leased property operated by the Department of Defense
using the facility to retrofit rocket motors under contract with the United
States government. Atlantic Research discovered through its own
investigation that the property became contaminated. The company then
remediated the site voluntarily and sued the United States under both §
107(a)(4)(B) and § 113(f)(1) to recover its costs. While the parties were still
negotiating a settlement, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Cooper Industries. The Court’s decision in Cooper Industries foreclosed
Atlantic Research’s contribution claim because the company had not been
subject to a CERCLA enforcement action. The company, therefore,
amended its complaint going forward only with its cost recovery claim under
§ 107.
Following the Eighth Circuit’s previous holdings—before Cooper
Industries—the district court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss
the cost recovery claim. This effectively left Atlantic Research with no
remedy at all under CERCLA. On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit
followed the reasoning of the recent decisions by the Second and Seventh
Circuits. Recognizing the unfairness of leaving voluntary remediators with
no remedy, the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court and held as follows:
while “PRPs that ‘have been subject to §§ 106 or 107 enforcement actions
are still required to use § 113,’” those that have not been subject to suit and
are therefore not entitled to seek contribution may pursue cost recovery
under § 107.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve what had
become a split of authority among the circuits. The Second, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits had now taken the position that PRPs could pursue cost
recovery claims, while other circuits continued to hold that they could not.
In taking the case, the Court expressed its intent to “decide [the] question
left open in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,” i.e, “whether §
107(a) provides [PRPs] . . . with a cause of action to recover costs from other
PRPs.” Applying a textualist approach, as the Court historically has with
CERCLA, the Court read § 107(a)(4)(B) in conjunction with subparagraph
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(a)(4)(A). Noting the parallel structure of the two subparagraphs, the Court
concluded that the phrase “any other person” in subparagraph (B) must
mean “any person other than [those named in subsection (A) (the United
States, a State, or an Indian tribe)].” “Consequently,” the Court concluded,
“the plain language of subparagraph (B) authorizes cost-recovery actions by
any private party, including PRPs.”
The Court rejected the notion that its decision would “create friction
between §§ 107(a) and 113(f)” or that the decision would “offer[] PRPs a
choice between §§ 107(a) and 113(f).” It described §§ 107(a) and 113(f) as
“two ‘clearly distinct’ remedies” and affirmed that “CERCLA provide[s] for
a right to cost recovery in certain circumstances . . . and separate rights to
contribution in other circumstances.’” As in Cooper Industries, however,
the Court clarified some issues while leaving a number of other key
questions unresolved. Atlantic Research affirmed that PRPs may seek
contribution under § 113(f)(1) only under limited circumstances:
When a party pays to satisfy a settlement agreement or a court
judgment, it does not incur its own costs of response. Rather, it
reimburses other parties for costs that those parties incurred . . . .
Hence, a PRP that pays money to satisfy a settlement agreement
or a court judgment may pursue § 113(f) contribution.
At the opposite extreme, the Court stated that PRPs could pursue cost
recovery claims against other liable parties for “costs [they] incur[]
voluntarily.” The Court further explained that one of the keys in
determining whether reimbursement would be by cost recovery or
contribution is whether a plaintiff’s expenses represented: (1)
reimbursement of another party’s costs; or (2) costs “incurred” directly by
the plaintiff itself. The Court also emphasized that a party “eligible to seek
contribution under § 113(f)(1)” could not “simultaneously seek to recover
the same expenses under § 107(a).”
Beyond that, however, the Court left a host of critical questions
concerning the intersection of §§ 107 and 113 unanswered. Those
unresolved issues have caused obvious confusion among the lower courts.
The range of unresolved issues and the financial uncertainty they have
created suggest that, after twelve years of silence on this important matter, it
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may be time for the Court to provide clearer direction for the lower courts
and the parties involved.

III. THE AFTERMATH OF ATLANTIC RESEARCH
A. The Substantial Unresolved Questions
While Atlantic Research clarified that claims under § 107 may be
available to PRPs when actions for contribution are not, it did little else to
“resolve the tension between § 107(a) and § 113(f).” As a result, the lower
courts have opined that “[n]avigating the interplay between § 107(a) and §
113(f) remains a deeply difficult task” and one that “has proven vexing.”
Other commentators have expressed the same concern. Even a brief
analysis of the many unresolved questions demonstrates how fractured the
lower courts have become and how helpful the Court’s guidance would be.
Among the key questions requiring clarification are the following: (1) May
costs incurred in response to a unilateral order that is not administratively
or judicially approved (i.e., “compelled” costs) be recovered through cost
recovery under § 107? (2) What constitutes an “administrative or
judicially approved settlement” for purposes of § 113(f)(3)(B)? Must the
settlement specifically address CERCLA liability, or is the provision broad
enough to encompass environmental liability generally? What is meant by
“resolving” one’s liability? If an agreement includes contingencies that are
not yet fulfilled when the agreement is signed, may the liability be
considered “resolved” at that point; if not, at what point is eligibility for
contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B) triggered?
77
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Are “Compelled” Costs Recoverable Under § 107?

The lower courts have expressed divergent views regarding PRPs that
incur cleanup costs in response to “unilateral orders” that are not driven by
enforcement actions. Such costs are “compelled” by regulatory authorities
and are thus not strictly “voluntary.” They result, however, from
interactions outside the administrative or judicial enforcement process.
Most courts that have considered this question have held that such unilateral
orders do not fall within § 113(f)(1) and thus do not trigger a party’s right to
seek contribution.
The Eighth Circuit, however, held in Morrison Enterprises that costs
incurred pursuant to a unilateral administrative order (“UAO”) were
recoverable only under § 113 because they were not “voluntarily” incurred.
Remarkably, the UAO in question was issued twelve years before the
plaintiff was sued by the EPA; thus, enforcement action was not even
contemplated at the time the plaintiff’s initial cleanup costs were incurred.
In its analysis of the issue, the Eighth Circuit focused on a statement in
footnote 6 of Atlantic Research where the Supreme Court said that “costs
incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B).” The
Eight Circuit did not address the fact the Supreme Court did not say that
only voluntarily incurred costs are recoverable under § 107(a)(4)(B).
81
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2.

What Constitutes an “Administrative or Judicially Approved
Settlement” for Purposes of § 113(f)(3)(B)?

As to this question, it might be more accurate to characterize the courts
as splintered than split. Since approximately 2010, the lower courts have
broadened the range of settlements that they have found to qualify as
81

Id.
Id.
83
See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 93–95 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
82

that a plaintiff who conducted cleanup under the terms of a consent order without being sued
could seek cost recovery under § 107 despite the fact that its expenses were “compelled”);
Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Env’tl Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 225–29 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that plaintiffs who settled following a suit by EPA were limited to seeking
contribution under § 113(f)(1), but plaintiffs who settled with EPA without being sued could
pursue cost recovery claims against defendants); Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 215
(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a plaintiff who conducted cleanup in response to an
Administrative Order on Consent whose terms had not yet been fulfilled could assert a cost
recovery action under § 107(a)).
84
Morrison Enters., L.L.C. v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2011).
85
Id. at 605.
86
Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 139 n.6 (emphasis added).
87
Id.

2019]

THE SIMULTANEOUS PURSUIT

57

“resolutions” of liability for purposes of § 113(f)(3)(B), and thus, the
differences among the courts have grown. Assuming this trend continues,
its effect will be to funnel an increasing percentage of claimants away from
§ 107 cost recovery as a potential remedy under CERCLA.
The courts have drawn distinct lines with respect to at least three
specific questions. First, a number of courts have expressly considered
whether a release conditioned upon contingencies that are not yet fulfilled
at the time an agreement is signed constitutes a “resolution” of liability. The
courts have been roughly evenly split on this issue. Some have held that a
party has not “resolved” its liability for purposes of § 113(f)(3)(B) until all
conditions listed in the settlement agreement have been met. Others have
held that liability is resolved when the agreement is signed, suggesting that
the government’s reservation of rights is no different from a provision in any
contract permitting enforcement in the event of a breach.
Second, the courts have diverged as to whether a resolution of liability
under state law invokes a right to seek contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B).
While the decisions are too few to identify any clear pattern, cases decided
after 2009 appear to have trended in the direction of recognizing a
resolution of claims under state law as a resolution of liability for purposes
of this provision.
Finally, the courts are divided on the question of whether an
administrative settlement must resolve CERCLA-like liability specifically or
may include environmental liability of a non-CERCLA nature. Again, the
trend has been in the direction of broadening the scope of settlement
agreements that meet the requirement and thus increasing the availability of
contribution (which, of course, reduces the availability of cost recovery).
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The Split of Authority on Simultaneous Cost Recovery and
Contribution Claims

While some of the questions discussed above have been ably
addressed by other scholars, the issue this article focuses on—the availability
of simultaneous cost recovery and contribution claims—has received scant
attention, even though it can profoundly affect parties caught up in
environmental litigation. Lacking clear direction on this question from the
Supreme Court, the lower courts have inevitably taken disparate
approaches. There is no present conflict among the circuit courts, but a
minority approach has developed among several district courts based upon
their interpretation of certain appellate opinions and their reading of the
Court’s Atlantic Research decision.
The three circuit courts that have considered this issue have all
answered the question in the affirmative. In Agere Systems v. Advanced
Environmental Technology Corp. —a Third Circuit case—plaintiffs sued a
group of PRPs over liability for toxic waste that was dumped at the Boarhead
Farms Site in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. For ease of administration, the
EPA had divided the Site into two Operable Units—“OU-1” and “OU-2.”
After settling the suit with the EPA, the plaintiffs pooled their resources and
initiated a cleanup. They then sued more than twenty non-settling
defendants seeking both cost recovery and contribution under CERCLA.
The litigation began in 2000, when the EPA sued three of the plaintiffs
with respect to OU-1. Those parties eventually entered into a settlement
agreement with EPA under which they established a trust fund to carry out
the cleanup under the agency’s supervision. Two additional plaintiffs—TI
Automotive Systems, L.L.C. (TI) and Agere Systems, Inc. (Agere)—were
not sued by the EPA but agreed with the other three PRPs to contribute to
the trust fund. In 2001, the EPA brought a second suit against four of the
plaintiffs (this time including TI) and entered into a second settlement
agreement with those four to fund a cleanup of OU-2. As before, Agere
agreed with the other four plaintiffs to contribute to the fund. All five
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plaintiffs then filed suit against the non-settling defendants in 2002 to
recover costs for both cleanups.
In determining which of the plaintiffs’ claims should survive the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
distinguished the costs that were associated with plaintiffs’ settlement
agreements with the EPA from those costs contributed by TI and Agere to
the plaintiffs’ trust fund. The three plaintiffs that had been parties to both
settlement agreements with the EPA were permitted to seek only
contribution from the defendants for costs they incurred at both Operable
Units. Agere, by contrast, was permitted to seek cost recovery under § 107
with respect to its costs for both OU-1 and OU-2. Because Agere had not
been sued by the EPA or the other plaintiffs before seeking cost recovery
from the defendants, it did not qualify for contribution regarding either
Operable Unit. TI was limited to a contribution action with respect to OU2 because its claim against the defendants was preceded by the EPA’s suit.
It was, however, allowed to seek cost recovery with respect to its costs for
OU-1.
In Bernstein v. Bankert, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
followed the same approach with respect to two distinct claims by the same
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were trustees of a fund created to finance and oversee
the cleanup of a site formerly used for waste handling and disposal.
Defendants were former owners of the site, their corporate entities, and
insurers. Plaintiffs entered into two Administrative Orders on Consent
(“AOCs”) with the EPA, in 1999 and 2002, each of which called for the
establishment of a fund for cleanup of the site in return for a release from
liability. Plaintiffs then sued the defendants, seeking cost recovery pursuant
to § 107.
The court determined that the plaintiffs had complied with the terms
of the 1999 AOC and obtained a full release from liability. That release
served as a trigger under CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B), thereby providing
plaintiffs a right to seek contribution. The statute of limitations for
contribution actions had run, however, so the circuit court affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim for costs related to the 1999 AOC.
Because plaintiffs had not yet fully complied with the terms of the 2002
AOC, they had not yet “resolved” their liability with respect to that
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agreement, and thus, had not triggered a right to pursue contribution. The
circuit court, therefore, held that plaintiffs established a basis for cost
recovery under § 107. The guiding principle in the court’s analysis was that
“each CERCLA right of action carries with it its own statutory trigger, and
each is a distinct remedy available to persons in different procedural
circumstances.” Thus, the cause of action was based upon the plaintiffs’
procedural circumstances with respect to each separate claim.
In the Ninth Circuit, the district court for the Central District of
California initially adopted the minority approach in Whittaker Corp. v.
United States. Whittaker owned and operated a facility in Santa Clarita,
California, where it had manufactured munitions for the United States
government for several decades. In 2000, it was one of several parties sued
by the Castaic Lake Water Agency and other plaintiffs for costs they had
incurred in responding to contamination in the local water supply. The case
against Whittaker was settled in 2007. In March 2013, Whittaker sued the
United States under CERCLA § 107 to recover costs it had incurred in
responding to contamination in soil and groundwater on its own property.
Whittaker acknowledged that it could only have sued the United States
under § 113 for costs associated with the Castaic Lake cleanup, but it
claimed that it could seek cost recovery under § 107 for the separate costs
it incurred in cleaning up its own site. The district court disagreed and held
that § 113(f)(1) “does not limit recovery to the scope of the settlement.”
Once the right to contribution is triggered under §§ 113(f)(1) or
113(f)(3)(B), the trial court said, all of a party’s costs—both before and after
that event—are subject to recovery only under § 113. The Ninth Circuit
reversed that decision, however, finding the reasoning of the Third and
Seventh Circuits in Bernstein, NCR, and Agere persuasive. The Circuit
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Court found the procedural circumstances of the plaintiff relevant but only
with respect to each specific claim.
The circuit courts, then, have been consistent in their approach to this
question, but district courts in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have
differed. Part IV of this article discusses in greater detail how and why they
have differed. The following section highlights, analyzing the South Dayton
Landfill litigation, the substantial difference this issue can make for a party
engaged in a CERCLA cleanup.
116

C.

Valley Asphalt and the South Dayton Landfill: A Case in Point

A recent case in the Southern District of Ohio—Hobart Corp. v.
Dayton Power & Light Co. —tangibly illustrates the need for the Court’s
117

attention to this issue. The story involves the Valley Asphalt Corporation,
which operates an asphalt recycling business in Moraine, Ohio, a suburb of
Dayton. The City of Moraine provides a commercial and industrial
presence on the south side of the Dayton metropolitan area. Straddling the
Miami River and the I-75 corridor, Moraine is strategically located to allow
Valley Asphalt access to its suppliers and markets. At the city’s north end,
where the Miami River turns south, is a former sand and gravel quarry. After
the quarry closed in the early 1940s, the site was operated for over half a
century as a landfill. The former quarry was filled with waste and covered
with soil over the years and is now the home of several businesses including
Valley Asphalt.
Unfortunately, while being used as a landfill, the site became heavily
contaminated. Following investigation in the early 2000s, responsible
118
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parties undertook a cleanup that is still ongoing. Serious remedial actions
began under the terms of three Administrative Settlement Agreements and
Orders on Consent (“ASAOCs”) entered into between the United States
Environmental Protection Agency and three potentially responsible
parties. Valley Asphalt also conducted cleanup on its own property—which
is considered part of the “site”—under the terms of a Unilateral
Administrative Order issued to it by EPA in 2013.
The three PRPs that signed the ASAOCs—Hobart Corporation,
Kelsey-Hayes Company, and NCR Corporation (“Plaintiffs” in the ensuing
litigation)—were among the most prominent users of the landfill. Those
three parties have conducted much of the cleanup under the terms of the
three ASAOCs, and they have sued more than thirty other parties
(Defendants) for contribution in order to recoup a portion of their costs
under CERCLA. Valley Asphalt has been one of the Defendants from the
earliest stages of litigation.
Although the amount of the Defendants’ liability has not yet been
determined, it is likely that Valley Asphalt will be required to share in the
Plaintiffs’ costs to some extent. In addition, Valley Asphalt has spent a
considerable sum remediating its own property pursuant to the separate
121
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OU2 (2016) (2016 ASAOC).
123
Order Pursuant to Section 106(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, As Amended (Docket No. V-W-13-C-008).
124
On May 24, 2010, Plaintiffs sued eight Defendants, including Valley Asphalt, under
CERCLA §§ 107(a) and 113(f)(3)(B) (Hobart I). On June 29, 2012, Plaintiffs sued four
additional companies for the same claims (Hobart II). On February 8, 2013, the District
Court ruled on both cases, dismissing Plaintiffs’ cost recovery claim under § 107 due to their
eligibility for contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B) based on the 2006 ASAOC. The court also
dismissed Plaintiffs’ contribution claim as untimely. See Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of
Ohio, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (S.D. Ohio 2013). The Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal
of both claims. See Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir.
2014). In April 2013, Plaintiffs sued all the Defendants included in the Hobart I and II claims
for contribution. Those claims, and Defendants’ possible counterclaims, are now being
resolved.

2019]

THE SIMULTANEOUS PURSUIT

63

order it received from EPA in 2013—the UAO. Valley Asphalt incurred
this separate liability even though other parties—including the Plaintiffs—may
well have been responsible for much of that contamination. Whether, and
to what extent, Valley Asphalt can recover those costs from the responsible
parties goes to the heart of the question addressed in this article—a question
the Supreme Court left unresolved when it last spoke to the issue of
CERCLA’s private party remedies. At this point, the district court has held
that Valley Asphalt will be limited to a contribution action and that it may
assert its claim only against parties other than the Plaintiffs. This will place
a significant evidentiary burden on Valley Asphalt and will severely limit its
potential recovery assuming it pursues that claim.
In the world of CERCLA, Valley Asphalt’s concerns are modest, and
its story alone might not warrant significant attention. But its experience is
not unique. The remedy sought by Valley Asphalt against the Plaintiffs has
been pursued by other parties similarly situated at sites throughout the
country, and the company’s dispute against the Plaintiffs highlights the need
for further clarity regarding “the interplay between [CERCLA] § 107(a) and
§ 113(f).” The author suggests that, with its adverse holding in Valley
Asphalt’s case, the district court has misinterpreted CERCLA’s cost
recovery framework, applying it in a way that would discourage voluntary
cleanups and be counterproductive to CERCLA’s goals.
125

126

127

128

D. The Problem—An Unwarranted Contribution/Cost Recovery
125

See, e.g., Defendant Valley Asphalt Corporation’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint, Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim at 7, ¶ 133, Hobart Corp. v. The Dayton
Power and Light Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 835 (S.D. Ohio 2014); BOWSER-MORNER, DRAFT
VAPOR INTRUSION MITIGATION WORK PLAN FOR VALLEY ASPHALT PROPERTY/SOUTH
DAYTON DUMP & LANDFILL (2013) (hereinafter “Vapor Intrusion Work Plan”).
126
Valley Asphalt leased its present ten–acre site and has operated an asphalt plant at that
location since the mid–1950s. It purchased the property in 1993, and the landfill closed three
years later. In 1997, buried drums containing hazardous waste were discovered on Valley
Asphalt’s property when the company installed a new sewer line at the plant. Only then did
the parties realize that the landfill had extended as far north as the southern half of Valley
Asphalt’s property. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC
HEALTH ASSESSMENT FOR SOUTH DAYTON DUMP AND LANDFILL, MORAINE,
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO EPA FACILITY ID: OHD980611388 (2008) (hereinafter
“Public Health Assessment”); see also Vapor Intrusion Work Plan, supra note 125.
127
Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 336 F. Supp. 3d 888, 896 (S.D. Ohio 2018).
Valley Asphalt asserted a counterclaim against the Plaintiffs for cost recovery under § 107
for the costs it incurred under the 2013 UAO. The district court has held, however, that
Valley Asphalt is limited to a claim for contribution and that the Plaintiffs are shielded from
such a claim by virtue of the contribution protection they received pursuant to CERCLA §
113(f)(2), when they settled their own liability with EPA and signed the ASAOCs.
128
PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ross Dev. Corp., 104 F. Supp. 3d 729, 739 (D.S.C. 2015).
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Dichotomy
District courts that have rejected the possibility of simultaneous cost
recovery and contribution claims have discerned, in the Atlantic Research
decision, a dichotomy that does not exist. The decision of the district court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin best illustrates the courts’ thinking. In
Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George Whiting Paper Co., the plaintiffs were
paper manufacturers engaged in a massive cleanup of the Fox River, near
Green Bay, Wisconsin. Many of the plaintiffs’ actions were dictated by
settlement agreements they had made with the EPA, and the plaintiffs
conceded that they could recover the costs for those actions from nonsettling parties only through contribution claims under § 113. The
plaintiffs had, however, incurred additional costs voluntarily outside the
scope of those agreements. For those costs, they claimed the right to pursue
cost recovery under § 107. The court, therefore, squarely faced the issue
of whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to seek contribution under § 113
while simultaneously pursuing cost recovery claims under § 107 for separate
expenses they had “voluntarily” incurred. The court opined that, in
resolving this important question, a court ultimately had to decide whether
the “focus [should] be on the nature of the costs themselves or on the
procedural status of the party seeking to recover those costs [i.e., the
plaintiffs].”
It seems the crux of the problem stems from what the courts have
meant when they say that § 107 is available for a party to recover
“voluntarily” incurred costs. Does “voluntary” mean that courts should
analyze all of a PRP’s costs to determine which costs were compelled and
which were voluntary? Or, instead, did the courts using that term assume
that once a Government enforcement action began, all costs incurred by the
PRP no longer qualified as voluntarily incurred costs?
Focusing on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Atlantic Research, which
was ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court, the district court concluded
that “courts are not interested in analyzing the particular nature of the costs
sought (as Plaintiffs prefer) but rather focus simply on the PRP’s procedural
status, specifically, whether it has been ‘subject’ to an enforcement action.”
129
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132

133

134

135
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129
130

572 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
Id. at 1041.

131

Id.
Id. at 1042 (emphasis added).
133
Id. at 1041–42.
132

134

Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Atl. Research Corp. 551 U.S. 128 (2007).
136
Appleton Papers, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.
135
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Assuming that it was faced with an either/or question—and had to decide
whether to focus on the nature of the costs claimed or on the procedural
status of the plaintiffs—the court chose to focus on the latter and dismissed
the plaintiffs’ cost recovery claims.
Seven years later, a decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States in
the district court for the Southern District of Texas followed precisely the
same reasoning. Exxon had signed two administrative consent orders with
the State of Texas for remediation of its Baytown facility. After spending
over $40 million cleaning up the plant, it sued the United States for cost
recovery under CERCLA § 107. In support of its cost recovery claim,
Exxon argued, first, that the consent orders with the State did not constitute
a “resolution of liability” for purposes of CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) because
it pertained to state regulations and were not tied to a CERCLA cleanup.
However, even if the agreements did trigger a right to contribution under
CERCLA, Exxon asserted that it had incurred substantial cleanup costs for
almost a decade before entering into those agreements and had, more
recently, incurred additional costs outside the scope of the agreements.
Even if it was limited to recovery by contribution for matters covered in the
settlement agreements, Exxon argued that it should be allowed to seek cost
recovery for any costs incurred outside their scope.
Citing a number of circuit court decisions for the proposition that
parties are restricted to contribution actions if contribution is available to
them —and drawing upon selected language from the Atlantic Research
decision emphasizing the “procedural circumstances [of] the PRP” —the
district court held that all of Exxon’s response costs were recoverable
through contribution including those outside the scope of the settlement
agreements and those incurred before the agreements were signed.
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which has
jurisdiction over Valley Asphalt and the South Dayton Landfill litigation,
also appears to have followed the minority approach. The effect can be
137
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108 F. Supp. 3d 486 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
The facility was originally owned and operated by Exxon’s predecessor, Humble Oil &
Refining Company. It included three components that produced synthetic rubber and one
that produced aviation gasoline to help with the war effort during the 1940s and 50s (World
War II and Korea).
139
Id. at 505.
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Id.
Id.
142
Id. at 506–09.
143
Id. at 506.
144
Id. at 505–06.
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See Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 336 F. Supp. 3d 888 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
141
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clearly seen in the court’s decision to deny Valley Asphalt the right to
countersue Plaintiffs under § 107 for the costs it has independently incurred
complying with the 2013 UAO.
In rejecting Valley Asphalt’s counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, the
court focused on the company’s procedural status and even failed to address
the nature of the cost Valley Asphalt was claiming. The court explained that
Valley Asphalt was “entitled to bring a § 113(f)(1) contribution claim by
virtue of the fact that it ha[d] been sued [for contribution] in the instant
action” by the Plaintiffs. The court did not respond to Valley Asphalt’s
argument that the expenses it claimed for vapor extraction mitigation on its
own property were directly incurred in compliance with a separate
administrative order. The court’s opinion contained only a cursory analysis
as it apparently concluded that it was following the Sixth Circuit’s lead in
Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio. The court rejected Valley
146

147

148

149

146

Id. at 896–97.
Id. at 896.
148
Id. at 893–97. Valley Asphalt claimed that it had “incurred costs in excess of $220,000 . .
147

. in compliance with the terms of a March 2013 [UAO]” for actions including “testing,
demolition of buildings and installation of a sub-slab vapor mitigation system.” Id. at 894.
The court’s response was that, because (1) Valley Asphalt’s property is part of the larger site,
and (2) Plaintiffs were ordered in the 2013 ASAOC to do the same work site-wide, Plaintiffs
were entitled to contribution from Valley Asphalt for that work and Plaintiffs’ suit to recover
those costs triggered Valley Asphalt’s eligibility for contribution. Id. at 900–01.
The court’s response arguably glossed over the EPA’s treatment of Plaintiffs’ 2013 ASAOC
and Valley Asphalt’s 2013 UAO as parallel responses. The EPA Region 5 personnel were
obviously aware of both initiatives. The same Regional On-Scene Coordinator transmitted
the March 22, 2013 UAO to Valley Asphalt by cover letter on May 21, 2013 and the April
5 ASAOC to the Plaintiffs on May 1. Valley Asphalt’s UAO repeatedly emphasized that the
“Work to Be Performed” (including design and installation of vapor abatement mitigation
systems) was “for Valley Asphalt Property.” In addition, the Vapor Intrusion Work Plan
prepared for EPA by Valley Asphalt’s contractor, Bowser-Morner, specifically noted that “[a]
group of Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) is working a project parallel to Valley’s in
accordance with the Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent for
Removal Action (ASAOC) with USEPA, for the SSDL site.”
Similarly, the Plaintiffs’ ASAOC specifically states that “EPA recognizes that the
Respondents have entered into an agreement wherein Respondent Valley Asphalt has
assumed the obligations set forth in this Consent Order to perform the Valley Asphalt Work
at the Site and the Group Respondents [Hobart, NCR and Kelsey-Hayes] have assumed the
obligations set forth . . . to perform the Non-Valley Asphalt Work at the Site.”
All of the above suggests that Valley Asphalt’s vapor intrusion mitigation work could be
reasonably viewed as parallel to, rather than duplicative of, the Plaintiffs’ work.
149
Id. at 894; Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2014). The
district court’s reliance was arguably misplaced, as the Sixth Circuit did not address the issue
in that decision. The only question resolved by the Circuit Court was whether a plaintiff that
had been sued by the government—thereby meeting the requirement to pursue an action for
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Asphalt’s assertion that the result was inequitable suggesting that the
alternative Valley Asphalt proposed would discourage voluntary settlements
by parties such as the Plaintiffs.
The final section of this article suggests that the majority approach to
this question is more consistent with CERCLA’s statutory text and scheme,
aligns with the Court’s decision in Atlantic Research, is more equitable than
the minority approach, and would promote voluntary settlements rather
than discourage them.
150

IV. RESOLVING THE COST RECOVERY/CONTRIBUTION DICHOTOMY
Resolving the concern raised in the previous section requires courts to
recognize that both the nature of the cost claimed in a CERCLA action and
the plaintiff’s procedural posture are relevant in determining the
appropriate remedy for a private plaintiff. Courts need not choose between
the two, and neither the text of CERCLA nor the Court’s opinion in Atlantic
Research suggest otherwise. Instead, the plaintiff’s procedural posture
regarding each specific cost should control for each claim or counterclaim.

A. Consistency with CERCLA’s Text and Structure
Given the way the Court has historically construed CERCLA, one
would expect it to follow a textualist approach if or when it chooses to
address this issue. The plain meaning of the statutory language would
therefore guide the Court to the extent its meaning can be discerned.
While CERCLA does not directly address this issue, its text and framework
both suggest an emphasis on discrete liabilities. The outer limits of
151

152

contribution—was precluded from asserting a cost recovery claim for the same expenses. The
court answered that question in the affirmative, but it did not address whether the plaintiff
could bring a cost recovery claim for other expenses incurred outside the enforcement
process. Id. at 776.
150
Hobart, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 896–97.
151
See Barkett, supra note 68 (asserting that, from Key Tronic Corp., in 1994, to
Waldeburger, in 2014, the Supreme Court’s decisions have been “guided by the plain
meaning of CERCLA’s text”). One could add to that list the decisions in Exxon Corp. v.
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986) and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). This
pattern has been true of the Court regardless of the perceived political bent of the authors of
the Court’s opinions (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Kennedy, Stevens and Thomas, for
example, have all applied a textualist approach).
152
See generally, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d
Cir. 2010).
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CERCLA liability are specified in § 107(a)(4)(A)–(D). The statute casts a
broad net by imposing liability upon multiple categories of defendants and
providing only a limited number of narrow defenses. However, liability
under CERCLA is “not unlimited.” Section 107(a) restricts liability not
only to costs actually incurred, but to those that are both “necessary” and
153

154

155

156

157

153

Those who are within the four classes of responsible parties listed in § 107(a)(1)–(4) and
do not meet any of CERCLA’s narrow defenses are liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government
or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources . . . ; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section
9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).
154
CERCLA § 107(a) imposes liability upon four classes of persons:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement,
or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person . . . , and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).
The courts have also held that liability may extend to corporate parents, subsidiaries and
successors, corporate officers, directors, and sometimes stockholders or counsel; trustees,
and even response action contractors. See, e.g., David O. Ledbetter et al., Outline of
RCRA/CERCLA Enforcement Issues and Holdings, CHEM. WASTE LITIG. REP. (2010).
155
CERCLA § 107(b) exempts from liability anyone who can establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that a release or threatened release was caused solely by: “(1) an act of God
(2) an act of war; or (3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). In addition § 101(20)(E) defines “owner” in
such a way as to exempt lenders that do not engage in management of the facility; the thirdparty defense in § 107(3) exempts “innocent” landowners, including contiguous landowners,
subject to certain conditions; and as part of the Brownfields program, an exemption was
added in § 101(40) for “bona fide prospective purchasers.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(E),
101(40), 107(3).
156
See, e.g., Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Onan Corp.
v. Indus. Steel Corp., 770 F. Supp. 490, 494 (D. Minn. 1989), aff’d, 909 F.2d 511 (8th Cir.
1990)).
157
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) provides that responsible parties are liable for “any other
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)
(emphasis added).
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spent in a manner “consistent with the national contingency plan.”
Furthermore, “contribution” toward a joint liability or “settlement” of a
liability to the United States or a State government —while possibly entailing
a substantial sum—is inherently limited in scope. The very nature of
“contribution” is that it consists of a share of some discreet amount. Thus,
reading the statute as a whole, every provision concerning liability under
CERCLA—whether for cost recovery or contribution—reflects an obligation
that is, out of necessity, limited in scope.
The structure of CERCLA also seems consistent with the majority
position on this issue. Section 107(a) provides the basic framework for
potential liability under CERCLA in broad terms. By contrast, § 113(f)
authorizes contribution actions for PRPs in comparatively narrow, specific
circumstances. A fair reading of these provisions together would suggest that
a CERCLA defendant is generally liable for “any . . . necessary costs of
response,” unless the specific circumstances delineated in § 113(f) have
been met—in which case the plaintiff would be limited to an action for
contribution. CERCLA’s provision for contribution protection reinforces
this structure. It provides contribution protection for a person who has
“resolved its liability . . . in an administrative or judicially approved
settlement,” but the protection it provides is expressly limited to “matters
addressed in the settlement.” Thus, the specific terms of the settlement
dictate the scope of protection the party enjoys. Therefore, under this
158
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Expenses must be incurred in a manner “not inconsistent with the [NCP]” if the plaintiff
is a government entity or Indian tribe. Id. at § 9607(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
159
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
160
Id. § (f)(3)(B).
161
This is consistent with the concept of “contribution” as described in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, which characterizes contribution as the recovery of an amount “in excess
of [a party’s] comparative share or responsibility,” suggesting that a party liable for
contribution is liable for no more than a share of a specific and limited (though possibly
substantial) amount. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
162
See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 135 (2007) (quoting King v. St.
Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)) (emphasizing that “[s]tatutes must ‘be read as
a whole’”).
163
See supra notes 21–35 and accompanying text.
164
See supra notes 153–157 and accompanying text.
165
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
166
The text of CERCLA does not expressly dictate this result but was so construed by the
Supreme Court in Cooper Industries. See supra notes 43–60 and accompanying text.
167
CERCLA § 113(f)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “A person who has resolved its
liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement
shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.”
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
168
Id. (emphasis added).
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provision, even a settling party is not sheltered from CERCLA claims as a
whole; it is arguably sheltered only from contribution claims and only with
respect to those matters that are within the scope of the agreement. It seems
counterintuitive that a statute that carefully limits the terms of liability based
upon specific procedural circumstances would then lump together all of a
party’s claims and ignore any procedural distinctions among them. It also
seems unlikely that Congress would limit contribution protection to the
scope of a settlement agreement while, at the same time, intending for the
courts to use the same agreement to dictate the form of recovery for every
claim that party might be able to assert.
Exxon’s cleanup of its Baytown facility provides an extreme example.
As explained previously, Exxon signed two administrative consent orders
with the State of Texas in 1995 calling for specific environmental response
actions at the facility. However, Exxon had already incurred substantial
cleanup costs beginning in 1986, and it continued to incur cleanup costs
outside the scope of the two agreements after they were signed. Because
the United States government had been heavily involved with wartime
production at the facility, Exxon sued the United States for cost recovery
under § 107 after conducting extensive cleanup.
The court determined that the settlement agreements Exxon signed
with the State constituted “settlements” within the meaning of CERCLA §
113(f)(3)(B). Under § 113(f)(2), therefore, Exxon could have received
contribution protection. That protection, however, would have been limited
to the “matters addressed” in the settlements. But despite the limited nature
of the contribution protection available to Exxon, the court held that the
same settlements restricted Exxon’s claim against the government to a
contribution action even for costs that fell outside the scope of the
agreements or were incurred as much as nine years before the agreements
were signed.
169
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B.

Consistency with the Atlantic Research Decision

In addition to being more consistent with the text and structure of
CERCLA, the approach recommended in this article would comport with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Research. Courts that follow the
169

United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 140 (2007) (noting that “[t]he
settlement bar does not by its terms protect against cost-recovery liability under § 107(a),”
but expressing doubt that “this supposed loophole would discourage settlement”).
170
See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.
171
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 3d 486, 505 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
172
Id. at 502–503.
173
Id. at 506.
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minority approach on this issue have cited two statements from that opinion,
which they assert support their position. Upon closer examination, however,
neither statement mandates the minority approach. The first statement is
actually a quotation from the Second Circuit’s opinion in Consolidated
Edison, which, in context, is at most ambiguous. When referencing the
Second Circuit’s opinion, the Court emphasized that the remedies of cost
recovery and contribution are not interchangeable but serve as
“complement[s]” to one another. Pulling a phrase from Consolidated
Edison to help elaborate that point, the Court explained that §§ 107 and
113 “provid[e] causes of action ‘to persons in different procedural
circumstances.’” Though minority courts point to that statement for
support, it does not specify that a party eligible to seek contribution for one
particular expense is automatically restricted to contribution with respect to
all of its potential claims or counterclaims. Neither the Supreme Court, in
Atlantic Research nor the Second Circuit, in Consolidated Edison, was
faced with that question, and neither explicitly addressed it.
A number of the lower courts have also cited a second statement from
Atlantic Research that furnishes a bright-line rule regarding the concurrent
use of cost recovery and contribution. The rule it articulates, however, is
very narrow; it does not address the question raised in this article, as some
courts have suggested. Expressing concern over the continued viability of
§ 113, the Court in Atlantic Research emphasized that a PRP could not
simply choose which remedy it wished to pursue. If a PRP is “eligible to
seek contribution under § 113(f),” the Court stated, then that party is
required to use § 113 as its remedy. The Court then stated that such a
plaintiff “[could not] simultaneously seek to recover the same expenses
under § 107(a).” Just as important as what this often-cited rule does say, is
likely what it does not say. In it, the Court merely precluded the use of both
§§ 107 and 113 to recover “the same expenses.” It did not clarify whether a
party could simultaneously seek both remedies to recover different
expenses. That door, therefore, was left ajar. Not surprisingly, the lower
courts have reached disparate conclusions on this issue, and further
clarification from the Court would be helpful. Until then, it is fair to say at
174
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Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 139.
176
Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 99).
177
See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. United States, 825 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2016); Bernstein v.
Bankert, 733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2013); Morrison Enterprises, LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d
594 (8th Cir. 2011); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112
(2d. Cir. 2010); ITT Industries, Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2007).
178
Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 132.
179
Id. at 139.
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Id.
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least that the approach recommended in this article comports with the
Court’s most recent guidance.

C.

Addressing Objections

Jurists and scholars have raised two significant concerns about the
approach recommended in this article. One objection is that such an
approach might discourage voluntary settlements. Those familiar with
CERCLA know that its purposes have always been to (1) promote the
prompt and effective cleanup of hazardous waste sites and (2) ensure that
those responsible for the dangers those sites represent pay for their
remediation. One of the keys to achieving these objectives is to encourage
voluntary cleanups. CERCLA’s contribution protection provision is
generally viewed as furthering timely cleanups by rewarding early
settlements. Some are concerned that if parties that have settled and
received contribution protection were later subject to cost recovery claims
(which presumably would provide joint and several liability), the incentive
to settle early and receive that protection would be reduced. The EPA and
the Department of Justice have consistently expressed this concern, whether
writing as parties to litigation or as friends of the court:
To encourage PRPs to settle with the United States, CERCLA bars
contribution claims against settling PRPs . . . . It is unclear whether
that bar, or an equivalent common law bar, would block a §
107(a)(4)(B) claim brought by one settling PRP against another . .
. . PRPs will be much less likely to settle with EPA and begin
cleanup work if they potentially remain vulnerable to such claims.
A unanimous Court, in Atlantic Research, foresaw that issue, and
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, addressed it squarely. He suggested
that allowing PRPs to pursue cost recovery under § 107 would “not
eviscerate the settlement bar set forth in § 113(f)(2).” First, he suggested, if
sued for cost recovery a defendant could invoke equitable apportionment
by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim. In determining the parties’ relative shares
181

182

183

184

185

186

181

See, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996); Dedham Water Co.
v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986).
182
See, e.g., Stefanie Gitler, Note, Settling the Tradeoffs between Voluntary Cleanup of
Contaminated Sites and Cooperation with the Government under CERCLA, 35 ECOL. L.Q.
337, 355–61 (2008).
183
See Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 140.
184
Brief of the United States Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae, 8–9, Hobart v. Waste
Mgmt. of Ohio, 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
185
Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 140.
186
Id. at 140–41.
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of liability, a court with discretion to “use[] such equitable factors as [it]
determines are appropriate” would likely account for the fact that the
defendant had settled early and conducted response actions in fulfillment
of its settlement. Given the cost of litigation, and the likelihood that a
court’s apportionment would weigh heavily in favor of the defendant in such
a case, some scholars have questioned whether cost recovery suits would
often be pursued in such cases. Second, the contribution bar would
continue to provide protection against contribution claims by other private
or government entities. Finally, a settlement with the government would
still “carr[y] the inherent benefit of finally resolving liability as to the United
States or a State” regardless of the party’s susceptibility to a cost recovery
claim from a private claimant.
Also, offsetting this concern is the likelihood that additional parties
might be encouraged to settle without litigation if they knew that cost
recovery under § 107 would be possible. The South Dayton Landfill
litigation illustrates this point. Other than owning land that had once been
part of the landfill, Valley Asphalt’s connection with that part of the site was
minimal. It had allegedly never deposited waste of any kind at the dump.
Nevertheless, it was one of thirty parties sued by the defendants who sought
contribution after settling claims with the EPA.
Valley Asphalt later agreed—without being sued—to initiate vapor
intrusion mitigation measures on its own land at considerable cost. It is not
clear how much of the contamination that created the need for mitigation
was caused by other parties, including the Plaintiffs; but Valley Asphalt’s
engineering consultants found that the soil and groundwater contaminants
on Valley Asphalt’s property were virtually the same as those found in the
landfill. Following the minority approach, however, the district court
dismissed Valley Asphalt’s cost recovery counterclaim against the Plaintiffs
and foreclosed any opportunity to discover the contributing role Plaintiffs
might have played in the expenses Valley Asphalt incurred.
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Although Valley Asphalt’s expenditure was not strictly “voluntary,” the
EPA was able to preserve critical resources because the company was willing
to act without being forced to do so through the enforcement process. This
article suggests that the incentives would be greater for parties in Valley
Asphalt’s position to settle outside of litigation or formal enforcement if
there were a realistic opportunity to recover a significant portion of their
costs from other liable parties.
Others have opined that permitting a § 107 cost recovery claim
following a judicially approved settlement under § 113(f)(3)(B) would allow
a plaintiff the benefit of joint and several liability while being shielded from
a contribution counterclaim. This concern is arguably exaggerated,
however, given the “mutually exclusive approach” the courts have
consistently followed. The Atlantic Research Court unanimously held that
a party entitled to pursue contribution may seek only that remedy. Given
that a resolution of liability under § 113(f)(3)(B) triggers a claim for
contribution, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a PRP could
resolve its liability with a government entity, receive contribution protection
under § 113(f)(2), and then pursue a cost recovery claim for the same costs.
194
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V. CONCLUSION
In Cooper Industries and Atlantic Research, the Supreme Court
provided sorely needed clarification regarding private party remedies under
CERCLA. Twelve years later, however, the boundary between §§ 107 and
113 remains obscure. Given the many unresolved issues, the disparity of
approaches among the courts, and the financial stakes for the parties
involved, the Court would be justified in granting certiorari in an appropriate
case to help bring clarity.
One of the issues on which the courts are divided is whether a party
may simultaneously pursue cost recovery and contribution for separate
claims or counterclaims. This article suggests that the majority of courts—
which allow parties to pursue both remedies under appropriate
circumstances—have gotten it right. They have struck a balance that
comports with the text and structure of CERCLA and rendered decisions
consistent with the Court’s decision in Atlantic Research.
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The majority approach also encourages voluntary cleanups and thus
helps further the goals of CERCLA. Offering the advantages of cost
recovery to parties that voluntarily remediate a site or conduct cleanups
beyond the scope required of a settlement agreement promotes the kind of
behavior CERCLA was intended to encourage. Even parties such as Valley
Asphalt—whose costs were not truly “voluntary”—make it possible for
authorities to preserve vital resources when they cooperate in the cleanup
process without having to be sued.
Courts that have taken a contrary position have done so based upon a
false choice between the nature of the costs incurred and the procedural
posture of the party seeking recovery. The appropriate way to resolve the
issue is to account for the procedural posture of the party with respect to the
specific cost it has claimed. A contrary approach does not conform to
CERCLA’s text and structure and is not mandated by the guidance the
Court has previously given.
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